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•
Given that qualitative researchers have (rightly) abandoned the idea of social scientific truths as mirrors of nature, what kindof truth do we hope to provide to our readers? In other words, what is the point of reading qualitative research? Taking in-
spiration from Paul Ricoeur’s distinction between a hermeneutics of suspicion and a hermeneutics of faith, this article sketches out
two possible answers. It first presents a critical approach that exposes hidden truths to educate and emancipate its readers. The
concept of ‘critique’ has recently come under scrutiny, however, with postcritical scholars denouncing its tautological reasoning, its
reductionist analytical strategies and its arrogant approach to other people. Acknowledging these criticisms, the article then goes
on to present a phenomenological approach that points out unnoticed truths to reverberate and resonate with its readers. It is argued
that this self-consciously ‘weak’ approach helps us circumvent the analytical issues currently associated with critique.
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Introduction
Knowledge. Evidence. Truth. Qualita-
tive researchers often refrain from using such
grandiose terms (in fact, some of us even
have problems writing these words without us-
ing ironic capitalization or metaphysical scare
quotes), because they seem tainted by a meta-
physical realism in which social reality is ‘out
there’, waiting to be empirically studied and
causally explained by the objective methods
of social science (Denzin, Lincoln & Giardina,
2006). In other words, these extravagant terms
convey the idea of social science as a neutral
purveyor of objective facts about the world, the
so-called correspondence theory of truth. Op-
posing this idea, qualitative researchers have
long insisted that social scientific knowledge
is socially, culturally, historically and politi-
cally embedded (Gergen, 1973). This rhetori-
cal strategy, however, raises an important ques-
tion: if qualitative researchers embrace a phi-
losophy of flux and abandon the idea of so-
cial scientific truths as mirrors of nature (Rorty,
1979), what kind of truth do we hope to pro-
vide to our readers? In other words, what is the
point of reading qualitative research? Taking
inspiration from Paul Ricoeur’s (1970) distinc-
tion between a hermeneutics of suspicion1 and
a hermeneutics of faith, this article sketches
out two possible answers: a critical approach
and a phenomenological approach. The arti-
cle first examines the critical approach, which
exposes hidden truths to educate and emanci-
pate its readers. In the past few years, however,
this approach has come under scrutiny. Eve
Sedgwick (2003), for instance, has forcefully re-
jected what she calls paranoid reading; Bruno
Latour (2004b) has provocatively argued that
critique has ‘run out of steam’, and Rita Felski
(2015) has cogently identified the limits of cri-
tique. Summarizing these arguments, we can
say that the critical approach has been faulted
for its tautological reasoning, its reductionist
analytical strategies and its arrogant approach
to other people. The article then goes on to
explore the phenomenological approach, which
points out unnoticed truths to reverberate and
resonate with its readers. It is argued that this
self-consciously ‘weak’ approach helps us cir-
cumvent the issues associated with the critical
approach. In the interests of full disclosure, I
should state that I consider my own research
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to belong to this latter camp, so this special is-
sue constitutes a welcome opportunity to ex-
plore the phenomenon of resonance: what is it?
When does it occur? And what does it do? To
enhance readability, I here provide a schematic
preview of the differences between the critical
approach and the phenomenological approach
(see Table 1):
Table 1
The Critical Approach: A
Hermeneutics of Suspicion
What since Ricoeur (1970) has become known
as the hermeneutics of suspicion is a collec-
tion of interpretive strategies that relies on an
architecture of meaning layered in terms of
surface/depth, manifest/latent or apparent/hid-
den, with a deep gulf separating these two
layers. As Marx (1971) famously declared:
‘All science would be superfluous if the out-
ward appearance and the essence of things di-
rectly coincided’ (p. 817). Accordingly, while
the hermeneutics of suspicion views the so-
cial world as inherently meaningful, it treats all
surface meanings with suspicion, because such
outward appearances are presumed to conceal
a deeper and truer layer of meaning. For Marx,
this hidden truth was class struggle; for Freud,
it was libidinous drives; for Nietzsche, it was
the will to power. Although operating be-
neath the surface, these structures are taken
to regulate people’s behaviour and condition
their experiences. Ricoeur’s masters of suspi-
cion therefore shared a profound mistrust of
people’s ordinary everyday experiences, which
they primarily approached in terms of false
consciousness. As a result, the critical approach
does not take its analytical object (whether this
be a statement, a dream or a common house-
hold item) at face value, but treats it as a sym-
bol in which ‘a direct, primary, literal mean-
ing designates, in addition, another meaning
which is indirect, secondary, and figurative and
which can be apprehended only through the
first’ (Ricoeur, 1974: 12f). In other words, the
hermeneutics of suspicion uses its analytical
object as a gateway to a deeper level of mean-
ing. Freud, for instance, saw the manifest con-
tent of a dream as little more than a carrier
for the significant content, which is latent. As
Frieden (1990) explains: ‘Freud’s dream theo-
ries rely on the basic opposition between man-
ifest and latent dream contents, between actual
dream images and concealed meaning, explicit
and implicit layers, surface and depth struc-
tures’ (p. 21).
To unlock its secrets, critical interpreters
read the analytical object in accordance with
a theoretical apparatus such as psychoanalysis
or Marxism. Using this theoretical master key,
the critical interpreter performs a symptomatic
reading of the object, which plumbs its depths
and digs out ‘a latent meaning behind a mani-
fest one’ (Jameson, 2013: 45). The hermeneutics
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of suspicion thus involves an element of eso-
tericism in that it presupposes the specific style
of reading that is necessary for that particular
form of decoding (Josselson, 2004). The pur-
pose of a symptomatic reading is to penetrate
the surface of the analytical object, get in touch
with its underlying layer of meaning and un-
mask this repressed truth. Such demystification
eschews the object’s apparent meaning in order
to uncover the truth that lurks beneath its sur-
face. As Ricoeur (1970) argues, ‘This hermeneu-
tics is not an explication of the object, but a
tearing off of masks, an interpretation that re-
duces disguises’ (p. 30). The quest for such hid-
den truth presupposes some sort of explanatory
structure that lies beneath and explains the sur-
face appearances (e.g. class struggle, libidinous
drives, will to power). While a recourse to such
grandmetanarratives has lost somemomentum
in our postmodern times, Felski (2015) convinc-
ingly argues that many strands of poststruc-
turalism can still be characterized as suspicious,
since they retain the basic architecture ofmean-
ing while simply inverting the relationship be-
tween surface and depth: ‘It is superficiality
that is now the hidden truth, while interiority
is demoted to a deceptive façade’ (p. 80). While
suspicious scholars traditionally ‘dig down’ to
excavate a hidden layer, and poststructuralists
‘stand back’ to denaturalize the analytical ob-
ject, both approaches require the interpreter
to tear away a veil of appearances in order to
expose what is really going on to the reader.
In both forms of interpretation, the researcher
is thus positioned as an enlightened author-
ity that has already discovered some truth and
must now lead others to see it, too.
Since this truth transcends everyday ex-
perience, it is not important that lay people
and other outsiders immediately understand or
agree to it. In fact, a cardinal objective of the
hermeneutics of suspicion is to debunk ordi-
nary people’s beliefs and educate them on the
hidden forces that drive their existence. This is
thought to emancipate them from the thrall of
false consciousness. ‘It is the lesson of Spinoza’,
Ricoeur (1970) argues, ‘one first finds himself a
slave, he understands his slavery, he rediscov-
ers himself free within understood necessity’
(p. 35). The truth shall set you free. Truth
in the critical approach can thus be understood
as a movement from secrecy to exposure, from
ignorance to knowledge, or from darkness to
light. This kind of learning can be considered as
a formation of critical consciousness, the abil-
ity to see through deceptive appearances, or
simply as the ‘unlearning of bullshit’ (Colaizzi,
1978). Brinkmann (2012) calls this critical strat-
egy ‘making the hidden obvious’ and uses Ian
Parker’s (1996) analysis of the directions on the
back of a tube of children’s toothpaste as an ex-
ample (p. 188f):
Directions for Use
Choose a children’s brush that has a
small head and add a pea-sized amount
of »Punch & Judy«–toothpaste. To
teach your child to clean teeth, stand
behind and place your hand under the
child’s chin to tilt head back and see
mouth. Brush both sides of teeth as
well as tops. Brush after breakfast and
last thing at night. Supervise the brush-
ing of your child’s teeth until the age
of eight. If your child is taking fluoride
treatment, seek professional advice con-
cerning daily intake.
Contains 0.8 per cent Sodium Monoflu-
orophosphate.
To the untrained eye, these directions may at
first glance look like innocuous instructions
for caring for one’s child, but Parker argues
that they actually contain a rich tapestry of
power, violence and domination. According
to Parker’s analysis, ‘Punch initiates the infant
and the audience (of children) into a form of vi-
olent (ir)rationality, a surplus of enjoyment in
the puppet narrative which is also, for the bat-
tered baby, and Judy, beyond the pleasure prin-
ciple’ (p. 191f). This symptomatic reading un-
masks the exercise of power that lurks behind
an otherwise innocuous everyday object. As a
result, the toothpaste text can no longer be read
with an innocent eye.
DistrustingTheHermeneutics of Suspicion
For many years, the merits of the critical ap-
proach seemed self-evident as social science
prided itself on exposing hidden power struc-
tures. Additionally, the very notion of ‘critique’
is normatively powerful: after all, who wants
to be associated with the uncritical, the gullible
32
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and the naïve? Gayatri Spivak (1996), however,
has argued that ‘Deconstruction, if one wants
a formula, is, among other things, a persistent
critique of what one cannot not want’ (p. 28). In
that spirit, the concept of critique has recently
come under scrutiny in academic fields like
queer theory, sociology and literary studies:
Eve Sedgwick (2003), for instance, has force-
fully rejected what she calls paranoid reading;
Bruno Latour (2004b) has provocatively argued
that critique has ‘run out of steam’, and Rita
Felski (2015) has cogently identified the lim-
its of critique. Two things need mentioning
with regard to this burgeoning field of so-called
‘postcritique’ (Anker & Felski, 2017). First,
while a backlash against critique may sound
like nostalgic yearning for natural scientific re-
alism, these postcritical scholars are emphati-
cally not seeking to replace meanings and in-
terpretations with objectivity and brute facts.
Paraphrasing Susan Sontag (1990), they read-
ily accept interpretation in the broad sense in
which ‘there are no facts, only interpretations’,
but protest the narrower sense in which criti-
cal interpreters say, ‘Look, don’t you see that X
is really—or, really means—A?’. Secondly, any
critique of critique can logically be faulted for
having critical aims itself, for having a blind
spot regarding its own hermeneutics of suspi-
cion (Barnwell, 2016). Postcritical scholars are
well aware of this performative paradox. Fel-
ski (2015), for instance, explicitly avoids laps-
ing into a metasuspicion that exposes, subverts
and dismisses critique. Her book is not ‘against’
disagreement, objection or negative judgment.
‘I have engaged in all these activities in the pre-
ceding pages’, as she states in its conclusion (p.
187). The goal of postcritique is not to do away
with critique, but to treat it simply as one lan-
guage game among others, to challenge the fact
that critique has become ‘a mandatory injunc-
tion rather than a possibility among possibili-
ties’ (Sedgwick, 2003: 125).
Apart from its hegemonic status, however,
what seems to be the matter with critique? Ac-
cording to postcritical scholars, there are at
least three additional problems. The first is-
sue is the strongly tautological nature of cri-
tique. According to Sedgwick (2003), its fierce
aversion to surprise means that critical inter-
pretation requires bad news to be known in ad-
vance. Presuming the inescapability of some
harmful entity X, however, leads researchers to
circularity: it is first argued that no area of in-
quiry is immune to the influence of X, because
X is an omnipresent systemic condition that
colours everything that we say and do. This
assumption leads to an ‘anticipatory mimetic
strategy’, in which the influence of X is pre-
sumed so as not to catch us off guard. In the
end, this interpretation ends up proving its own
assumption, namely that X is significant. We
inevitably end up at the predetermined destina-
tion, but, as Felski (2008) asks, ‘what virtue re-
mains in the act of unmasking when we know
full well what lies beneath the mask?’ (p. 1).
This circular reasoning leads us to a second flaw
of critical interpretation, namely that it is (or
at least can be) peculiarly reductionist. The
critical approach treats its analytical objects as
symbols that, when properly read, yield hidden
truths about large-scale, »hypostasized villains«
(Fleissner, 2017) like Neoliberalism, Patriarchy,
Technocracy or Capitalism. The analytical ob-
ject thereby serves as a reflection, expression,
or manifestation of one of these larger entities.
The problem with this interpretive strategy is
not that it is necessarily wrong (in fact, it might
be alarmingly accurate), but that the analyti-
cal object is reduced to allegory and ceases to
matter. As Latour (2005) argues: ‘If some “so-
cial factor” is transported through intermedi-
aries, then everything important is in the fac-
tor, not in the intermediaries. For all practical
purposes, it can be substituted by themwithout
any loss of the nuances’ (p. 105). The critical
approach strips the analytical object of agency
and reduces it to a neutral instrument that sim-
ply transports meaning from one domain to an-
other.
Finally, there is the arrogant demeanour of
critique. According to Latour (2004b), critical
scholars have always known better than ordi-
nary actors, often dismissing and deconstruct-
ing these people’s naïve beliefs. ‘You have to
learn to become suspicious of everything peo-
ple say because of course we all know that they
live in the thralls of a complete illusio of their
real motives’ (p. 229). Critical interpreters are
presumed to have privileged access to theworld
compared to ordinary actors, whose under-
standings are taken to spring from hidden en-
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tities of which they remain blissfully unaware.
Accordingly, critique adopts a rather conde-
scending stance towards other people, who are
treated as self-deluded pawns: ‘Forgive them
Father, for they know not what they do’ (La-
tour, 1996: 199). When language is taken to
speak through people, for instance, individu-
als become unwitting mouthpieces for certain
discourses, and we can safely brush away their
own understandings of what they say and do.
This critical strategy can also be found outside
the walls of academia. Not too long ago here in
Denmark, for instance, a male Member of Par-
liament suggested that female left-wing politi-
cians who oppose increased immigration con-
trol are acting under the sway of repressed sex-
ual desire for Middle Eastern men.2
Conversely, politicians who favour in-
creased immigration control are often accused
of acting out of latent racism rather than le-
gitimate political concerns. In both cases, the
assumption is not only that the other party is
mistaken about their ownmotives (‘Look, don’t
you see that what you’re doing, X, is really—or,
really means—A?’), but also that, if they only
realized the truth of this interpretation, they
would presumably change their wicked ways.
Just like that, political disagreement turns into
epistemological deficiency. In the words of Ri-
coeur (1981): ‘Ideology is the thought of my
adversary, the thought of the other. He does
not know it, but I do’ (p. 186). Summarizing
these arguments, we can say that the critical
approach has been faulted for its tautological
reasoning, its reductionist analytical strategies
and its arrogant approach to other people.
The Phenomenological Approach:
A Hermeneutics of Everydayness
How do we overcome the shortcomings of the
critical approach? There are almost as many
suggestions as there are detractors. In this
section, however, I want to sketch out a phe-
nomenological approach derived from Division
I of Martin Heidegger’s magnum opus Being
and Time (1927/2008). According to Hubert
Dreyfus’s (1991) highly influential interpreta-
tion of this book, this first division relies on
a hermeneutics of everydayness (equivalent to
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of faith), while the sec-
ond division goes on to apply a hermeneutics
of suspicion. ‘The job of Division I is thus
to call attention to those aspects of everyday
activity that that activity itself makes it diffi-
cult for us to notice’ (p. 36). Calling atten-
tion to unnoticed aspects of everyday activ-
ity is in fact a succinct characterization of the
phenomenological approach that follows. The
overarching principle of Heidegger’s – and, in-
deed, any—phenomenological approach is cap-
tured in the famousmaxim ‘To the things them-
selves!’ (Zu den Sachen selbst! ) (Carman, 2006).
But what exactly are such things? According
to Heidegger, they are neither physical objects
nor brute matters of fact, but phenomena de-
fined as ‘that which shows itself in itself’ (p.
51). Importantly, such phenomena cannot be
reduced to mere appearances, and Heidegger
ferociously opposed any suchmetaphysical dis-
tinctions between appearance and reality: ‘Be-
hind the phenomena of phenomenology’, he ar-
gued, ‘there is essentially nothing else’ (p. 60).
Phenomenology thus relies on a flat architec-
ture of meaning: human being is interpretation
‘all the way down’ (Dreyfus, 1991). There is
nothing lurking behind our everyday practices
that can be invoked to explain them; there is
only interpretation within these practices, and
the researcher’s job is to ‘interpret the interpre-
tation embodied in our current practices in as
comprehensive and responsible a way as pos-
sible’ (Dreyfus, 1980: 14). But if phenomeno-
logical inquiry is concerned with ‘that which
shows itself in itself’, then what is the point of
doing it? What does it let us see that we do
not already know? ‘Manifestly, it is something
that first and foremost precisely does not show
itself’, Heidegger argued, ‘something that, in
contrast to what first and foremost shows itself,
is hidden, but is at the same time something that
essentially belongs to that which first and fore-
most shows itself, and belongs to it in such a
way as to constitute its meaning and ground’
(p. 59). The first law of phenomenology states
that what is closest to us in our everyday ac-
tivity remains furthest from us in terms of our
ability to take it up and understand it (Thomson,
2009). AsWittgenstein (2009) said: ‘The aspects
of things that are most important for us are hid-
den because of their simplicity and familiarity.
(One is unable to notice something—because it
34
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is always before one’s eyes.)’ (§129). The pur-
pose of phenomenology is to point out these
obvious but unnoticed aspects. This process
is known as disclosure, Heidegger’s translation
of the Greek word aletheia, which means to
discover or draw out of concealment—to make
the unnoticed noticed. In this process, the
phenomenological researcher acts as an expe-
riential guide who uses meticulous attention to
detail and evocative examples to convey their
analysis. The phenomenologist’s job is to point
out details and make them ‘light up’ in order to
get the reader to notice them. The phenome-
nologist’s endeavour is thus somewhat simi-
lar to Toril Moi’s (2017) description of Sherlock
Holmes’s investigative process: ‘It’s not that
the others look at the surface, whereas Sher-
lock looks beneath it. It is that he pays at-
tention to details they didn’t think to look at’
(p. 186). In other words, the phenomenolog-
ical researcher applies the hermeneutical con-
ception of interpretation as explication (Ausle-
gung), which means to lay out, unfold and elu-
cidate (Dreyfus, 1980). Such explication is re-
lated to what Albert Borgmann (1984) calls de-
ictic discourse: ‘The word “deictic” comes from
Greek deiknýnai, whichmeans to show, to point
out, to bring to light, to set before one, and then
also to explain and to teach. Speakers of deictic
discourse never finally warrant the validity of
what they tell but point away from themselves
to what finally matters; they speak essentially
as witnesses’ (p. 178).
To achieve disclosure, phenomenological
inquiry takes departure in human experience
in its average everydayness. Contrary to the
hermeneutics of suspicion, the hermeneutics
of everydayness has faith in people’s experi-
ences of the world. This is not to say that
people always know with certainty why they
are acting (phenomenology is not seeking a
return to the self-transparent Cartesian sub-
ject), but that it is imperative to trace mean-
ing back to people’s lived experiences. As Fel-
ski (2015) puts it, ‘I strive to remain on the
same plane as my object of study rather than
casting around for a hidden puppeteer who is
pulling the strings’ (p. 6). Phenomenology thus
offers understanding from within: truth may
be unnoticed, undiscovered, or hidden in plain
sight, but it is there. The devil is in the details.
In my own research on digital technology, I
subscribe to an actor-network-inspired variant
of phenomenology called postphenomenology
(Aagaard, 2017). While the topic of technol-
ogy will not be further explored here, I find it
instructive to follow postphenomenology’s re-
fusal to treat its analytical objects (i.e. technolo-
gies) as mere epiphenomena. Instead, postphe-
nomenology follows Latour’s (2005) injunction
to treat things as concrete and ‘worthy’ actors
in their own right. The analytical object has
to be treated as a fully fledged and irreducible
phenomenon that is investigated in its speci-
ficity. As Don Ihde (1998) maintains: ‘The post-
modern hermeneutics of things must find ways
to give voices to things, to let them speak for
themselves’ (p. 158). This insistence on letting
things speak impedes large-scale critiques of
Capitalism, Technocracy or Neoliberalism, be-
cause, at this level of abstraction, technologies
are often reduced to mute symbols of such neb-
ulous entities (Aagaard, 2017).
Resonance: The Phenomenological
Nod of Recognition
But if phenomenology neither discovers ob-
jective facts nor unmasks hidden truths, then
what does it do? According to Max van Ma-
nen (1990), a good phenomenological descrip-
tion resonates with life and evokes the phe-
nomenological nod of recognition. The concept
of resonance derives from the words re (back,
again) and sonare (to sound) andmeans to echo,
reverberate, or ‘re-sound’. The goal of phe-
nomenology is thus not to shock or surprise,
but to strike a chord of familiarity with its read-
ers. When a text resonates with the reader, it
excites, stimulates and sets the person in mo-
tion. It moves the reader. What van Manen
calls the ‘phenomenological nod’ is the embod-
ied expression of such experiential resonance.
As Michaele Ferguson (2009) argues, applying
resonance as a validity criterion helps us steer
between the tricky extremes of false universal-
ism (‘everybody shares the same experiences’)
and idiosyncratic subjectivism (‘each person’s
experiences are unique’): ‘We can only gen-
eralize from these experiences for those with
whom they resonate’ (p. 54). A phenomenolog-
ical interpretation offers itself to anyone read-
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ing the article, but does not lay claim to uni-
versality. One of phenomenological research’s
ardent critics, John Paley (2017), raises a crit-
ical objection to using resonance as a validity
criterion, namely that, if the phenomenologi-
cal nod is the litmus test of good research, then
phenomenology cannot tell us anything thatwe
did not already know: ‘In which case, what’s
the point of it?’ (p. 71). So, is phenomenology
just trite, predictable and uninformative? Not
at all. By pointing toward something that has
remained unnoticed and overlooked, but which
we immediately recognize when it is pointed
out, phenomenological research helps us notice
and spell out certain important aspects of our
everyday practices.
Brinkmann (2012) calls this phenomenolog-
ical strategy ‘making the obvious obvious’ and
uses Iris Marion Young’s seminal article Throw-
ing Like a Girl (1980) as an example. In this ar-
ticle, Young describes how women are social-
ized to comport their bodies in inhibited ways
when throwing (but also when walking, lift-
ing, and so forth): while boys step forward, ro-
tate their hips and shoulders, and hurl the ball
forward, girls do not bring their whole bodies
into motion. ‘Rather, the girls tend to remain
relatively immobile except for their arms, and
even the arm is not extended as far as it could
be’ (p. 142). Girls, in other words, throw only
with their forearm and elbow joint. In accor-
dance with the criterion of resonance, Young
notes that this analysis is not necessarily appli-
cable to all women and may also apply to some
men (there is a famous picture of then Presi-
dent Barack Obama ‘throwing like a girl’ as he
throws the ceremonial first pitch at the Wash-
ington Nationals’ 2010 home opener). Never-
theless, Young’s analysis (sadly) resonates with
many of us. As Bonnie Mann (2009) puts it:
‘“Like a girl” is one of those phrases we wish
didn’t make sense, and hope one day will not’
(p. 84). Young does not simply describe the
overt physical movements involved in femi-
nine body comportment, however, but metic-
ulously analyses the meaning of such com-
portment: inhibited intentionality. This mean-
ing does not lie hidden behind, beneath or be-
yond the phenomenon, but originates from the
steady repetition of restricted movements over
time. The issue is not spatial, but chronologi-
cal. Young’s article certainly is not uncritical,
but alters the usual direction of attack: instead
of finding patriarchy hidden behind everyday
practices, Young demonstrates how it is consti-
tuted within them. Patriarchy is not so much
expressed in baseball as it is performed or en-
acted within it.
It should be mentioned that the phe-
nomenological approach described here is more
akin to a broad, qualitative stance than a sub-
stantial theoretical allegiance. Accordingly, the
concept of resonance is in no way limited to
texts that self-identify as phenomenological.
In fact, the first time I remember having the
phenomenological nod of recognition evoked
was not at all while reading phenomenology,
but when, as an undergraduate, I read Erving
Goffman’s descriptions of behaviour in pub-
lic places. Goffman’s knack for dissecting the
micro-dramas of everyday life has led Pierre
Bourdieu (1983) to characterize him as a ‘dis-
coverer of the infinitely small’ and Howard
Becker (2003) to describe his work accordingly:
‘To begin with, many of the things he gives
names to are well known to us, his readers.
We recognize them immediately; they are fa-
miliar experiences we have had or events we
have witnessed. But, and this is a very impor-
tant but, we don’t have names for these experi-
ences and events […] We feel that we have al-
ways known it but, until Goffman gave it to us,
did not know its name’ (p. 663). As an example
of this uncanny ability, here is a brief excerpt
fromGoffman’s (1963) descriptions of civil inat-
tention: ‘Where the courtesy is performed be-
tween two persons passing on the street, civil
inattention may take the special form of eyeing
the other up to approximately eight feet, during
which time sides of the street are apportioned
by gesture, and then casting the eyes down as
the other passes – a kind of dimming of lights’
(p. 84). Reading this passage, I immediately
recognized the phenomenonGoffman describes
and thought to myself, ‘How have I never no-
ticed that before?’. It’s not that my previous
way of perceiving theworldwas somehow false
or mistaken; I simply had not noticed that par-
ticular aspect of life before and was now struck
by it. Accordingly, resonance does not so much
penetrate a veil of ignorance as sharpen the
reader’s sensory apparatus. As Latour (2004a)
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puts it: ‘The more you learn, the more differ-
ences exist’ (p. 213). And after reading Goff-
man’s texts, one’s world becomes slightly more
articulated.
Conclusion
The critical and phenomenological approaches
share a number of family resemblances. They
both view mainstream psychology as flawed
in its objectivism and instead take departure
in an inherently meaningful social world (i.e.
they are both hermeneutic). As a result, both
approaches take an interpretive approach to
studying human beings. Although quite simi-
lar in that respect, however, the two approaches
are far from identical, and it was this arti-
cle’s contention that the phenomenological ap-
proach helps us circumvent the problems that
postcritical scholars have pinpointed.
First, there is the tautological notion of al-
ready knowing what you are going to find. The
phenomenological approach tries to avoid this
circular disposition by remaining modest, at-
tentive and inquisitive concerning its analyti-
cal objects. Using Sedgwick’s distinction be-
tween weak and strong theory, we might say
that the phenomenological approach has delib-
erately fashioned itself as a ‘weak’ theory that
strives to give credence to the things them-
selves. Does this lead us back to the naïve re-
alism that we so desperately want to avoid?
To an indiscriminate acceptance of the myth of
the given? This is certainly an understandable
concern, since some phenomenological schol-
ars claim that phenomenology liberates us from
theory and allows us to see the light of lived
experience (see Aagaard, 2017). Phenomenol-
ogy, however, is emphatically not a neutral lens
through which we perceive a pre-given phe-
nomenon, but an intellectual tool that shapes
our research process all the way down to data
collection: it influences what we see, which
questions we ask, and what ultimately stands
forth as significant (Aagaard, 2017). A weak
theory, in other words, is not the same as an
empty theory. This clarification clears the way
for an important distinction: although phe-
nomenology dictates what to look at (i.e. ex-
perience), it remains open as to what we may
find. By mediating the research process with-
out determining its outcome, it thereby helps
us break out of the tautological loop.
Secondly, there is the issue of reduction-
ist analytical strategies. The critical approach
treats the analytical as a symbol that has to
be deciphered by an enlightened authority.
This manoeuvre often leads us back to the
usual suspects of Discourse, Power and Capi-
talism. The phenomenological approach, how-
ever, does not grantmuch explanatory power to
these macroscale entities, but treats its analyti-
cal objects as fully fledged and irreducible phe-
nomena. We have to beware of one seemingly
obvious consequence of this analytical move:
to grant the idea that phenomenology is well
suited for exploring phenomena at the individ-
ual level, but struggles to account for larger po-
litical and socio-economic structures. This kind
of concession plays right into the stereotypi-
cal characterization of phenomenology as naïve
and subjectivist (for an excellent discussion of
this long-standing critique, see Greiffenhagen
& Sharrock, 2008). But phenomenology does
not advocate political complicity and quietism,
nor does it endorse the status quo or hinder cri-
tique, as we have seen with Young’s (1980) arti-
cle. On the contrary, to give an account of po-
litical structures without attention to how we
live them is to risk an abstract objectivism that
cannot grasp the lived experience of structural
injustice (Mann, 2009).
Finally, there is the idea that critical schol-
ars possess an acute awareness of the hidden
structures that prefigure and mould other peo-
ple’s experiences. In the situated perspective
of phenomenology, there is no external van-
tage point from which the researcher can as-
sume this privileged position vis-à-vis their an-
alytical object. On the contrary, phenomenol-
ogy wants to lead us back to the everyday
world, and in this endeavour it considers peo-
ple’s lived experience as a helpful ally against
overly restrictive understandings: when suf-
ficiently probed, lived experience exhibits nu-
ances that cannot be contained by crass philo-
sophical binaries. Although it was not this ar-
ticle’s intention to let critique serve as a dialec-
tical foil to phenomenology (things are not al-
ways simply as they appear, and critique cer-
tainly has its rightful place in qualitative re-
search), this last issue constitutes a challenge
to critique: when critical interpreters challenge
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or contradict the sentiments expressed by or-
dinary people, they owe us an account of the




Ricoeur’s now-famous phrase ‘hermeneutics of sus-
picion’ is actually nowhere to be found in Freud and
Philosophy (1970), but came up at a later date (Scott-
Baumann, 2009).
2.
Incredible as it may sound, this accusation actu-
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